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In 1960, recognizing the lack of preparedness on the part of public higher education to deal 
with the drastically increasing population, California enacted legislation that included universal ac-
cess to community colleges, increased support for state college polytechnic programs, and continued 
emphasis on the university research mission. The California Master Plan for Higher Education, for-
mally implemented through the Donahoe Higher Education Act (1960), was developed by leaders 
from various fields, including public and private higher education, business, and government. Clark 
Kerr (2001), then President of the University of California (UC) and a key person in the develop-
ment of the plan, remarked that more than anything, it was “a desperate measure to prepare for a 
tidal wave of students, to escape state legislative domination, (and) to contain escalating warfare 
among its separate segments” (p. 172). Yet the plan, and more importantly the vision it put forth, 
developed the largest number of high-level research campuses in the U.S. while ensuring the educa-
tional demands of an advancing technocratic society would be fulfilled.  
The California Master Plan created a coordinated field of higher education in which the var-
ious institutional sub-fields understood their particular missions and could plan accordingly. A pri-
mary concern of the planners was the desire for state colleges to be recognized as research universi-
ties and share in the federal research and development money such status brings. At the time, Cali-
fornia had 15 percent of the country’s research universities, but comprised less that 10 percent of 
the nation’s population (Kerr, 2001). Understanding the need for polytechnic education the state 
colleges provided, as well as the increased operational costs that research status brings, the responsi-
bility for academic research remained within the UC system. It was understood by most policy mak-
ers and higher education leaders that California did not need any more research universities at that 
time (Kerr, 2001). 
 
The State of Texas 
 
The state of Texas at the turn of the new millennium, was in a much different predicament 
with regards to public research universities. There were only two Texas public universities that 
would be considered tier one, the popular and informal designation referencing institutions that 
produce the highest levels of academic research as defined by the Carnegie Foundation Classifica-
tions (n.d.). Here, I refer to these institutions as Research Universities One (R1). California, a state 
often used for comparison with Texas due to its relative population size and gross domestic product 
output, had eight public institutions that were R1 in 2003. The Texas Higher Education Coordinat-
ing Board (THECB) recognized that federal research support was the primary contributor to such 
activity, and recommended an increase in the proportion of such funding, setting various bench-
marks pertaining to science and engineering obligations to Texas universities. In an effort to increase 
the state university proportion of federal research dollars, THECB provided formal recommenda-
tion to the Texas Legislature with Closing the Gaps by 2015, establishing benchmarks that called for an 
increase from 5.5 percent of federal research obligations in 2000 to 6.2 percent by 2015, amounting 
to more than doubling total research expenditures during that time period (THECB, 2000).  
In 2009, the Texas legislature created the Texas Research Incentive Program (TRIP), provid-
ing matching funds to private gifts for a newly established institutional grouping known as Emerging 
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Research Universities (ERU). Later that year, the National Research University Fund (NRUF, 2009) 
was established, creating a dedicated and independent fund to assist ERUs in achieving national 
prominence with regards to research status. Then Governor Rick Perry believed the NRUF would 
serve as a “clear road map to help emerging research institutions reach the next level” (UH, 2009). 
Benchmarks for the NRUF included restricted research expenditures of at least $45 million, com-
mitment to high quality graduate education, and awarding of at least 200 Ph.Ds annually (NRUF, 
2009). 
 
Academic Drift 
 
California state colleges and ERUs in Texas demonstrate the various ways that states ap-
proach the dilemma of academic drift (Kerr, 2001). Public institutions straying from their traditional 
roles in search of prestige can underserve the demands of students while bringing about higher edu-
cation systems that are more expensive (Morphew, 2009). California recognized the need for afford-
able polytechnic education, and a coordinated system ensured that access to a quality higher educa-
tion be available to all state residents. Texas encouraged state universities to strive for status associ-
ated with academic research by rewarding such behavior with the lure of additional funding. Com-
paring the ideologies that drive policies in both Texas and California demonstrates the differences 
between equity-driven policy versus policy driven by privatization and competition. These states’ 
policies emphasize the influence that ideology has on how organizations react to state policy and 
organizational legitimacy. The desire for status is apparent in both situations, though in the context 
of Texas, ERUs have begun taking on attributes and characteristics of organizations that are more 
expensive to operate and maintain, a problem for institutions that have historically served as access 
points for bachelor’s degrees. The increased emphasis on research productivity at state institutions 
occurs within the same policy environment that demands these institutions are more efficient and 
affordable. How can these seemingly competing priorities coexist?  
 
Strategic Action Fields 
 
Efforts to prevent or persuade increased emphasis on academic research at state colleges and 
regional universities demonstrate how emerging fields of higher education can be influenced 
through various policies and incentives. Utilizing the concept of strategic action fields (Fligstein & 
McAdam, 2012) this paper explains changes in organizations by providing insight into how state pol-
icy influences constructed, meso-level social orders. Expanding on Pierre Bourdieu’s (1996) concept 
of fields, defined as the structured arena where practice occurs, strategic action fields extend the 
analysis to that of groups of actors competing for advantage and resources to increase their capabili-
ties and reputations.  
Strategic action fields are socially constructed in that they are based on subjective standings. 
They have boundaries that shift based on varying situations and promote a set of shared understand-
ings amongst their members that are fabricated over time. Membership within a specific field is lim-
ited to “those groups who routinely take each other into account in their actions” (Fligstein & 
McAdam, 2012, p. 168), thus within this analysis, only universities and colleges who strive for R1 
status are included. Removing all other actors from the field analysis brings attention to the relation-
ships between groups who compete for position within the particular field, exposing precisely what 
is of value in these relations. In the case of state colleges in 1960s California and ERUs in present 
day Texas, external research funding is a coveted resource, but it is only a means to achieving pres-
tige associated with tier one status.   
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Membership and Field Dynamics 
 
It is understood that all fields emerge and change over time. Moreover, fields are made up of 
incumbent groups—those who possess disproportionate advantages against groups of challengers 
who wield fewer resources and influence over field dynamics. The aim of incumbent groups is to 
solidify their advantage within the field, while the role of challengers is to take advantage of oppor-
tunities that increase their influence amongst the status hierarchy. These moments of contention can 
be caused by various exogenous shocks or even instability within corresponding fields that send rip-
ples through the greater field environment (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012).  
These constructed social orders are meso-level in nature in that they are made up of fields 
and sub-fields that are hierarchically structured based on a perceived social status. The relative posi-
tion between and within various groups determines an institution’s legitimacy (Fligstein & McAdam, 
2012). All fields are embedded within a complex web of other fields, each possessing varying levels 
of potential and influence over their own affairs and the functioning of others. The state can be seen 
as a set of strategic action fields that have tremendous influence over shaping the practice and stabil-
ity in almost every non-state field (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). The set of shared understandings 
that govern individual fields are defined by the state and serve the interests of incumbent members 
by reproducing field conditions that will continue to be self-serving in determining the standards of 
prestige. Fields are often managed by various Internal Governance Units (IGU), non-state actors 
who assist in the reproduction of field conditions (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012).  
 
Fields of American Research Universities 
 
The field of American research universities can best be understood as a general field, made 
up of four-year universities that conduct academic research and educate doctoral students. Within 
this field, there are various subfields determined by a particular institution’s ability to conduct re-
search. The boundaries of these sub-fields vary but are generally determined by one’s designation by 
the Carnegie Classifications (2018). It is important to note that these classifications should not be 
thought of as rankings but are intended to provide a framework of comparable institutions for edu-
cational and research purposes. These classifications take into account various metrics related to re-
search, and are generally most competitive and status worthy within the sub-field distinction of R1. 
Within this subfield of research universities, status hierarchy is most sensitive at the top, as competi-
tion for resources is fierce between those institutions with the strongest abilities. Those universities 
located towards the bottom pay close attention to their actions and those of peer institutions most 
similar to their capabilities. Worse than not reaching R1 status is emerging into this sub-field and 
then falling out five years later. The Carnegie Foundation, unintentionally of course, functions as an 
IGU, as its classifications serve as a symbolic system that legitimates the hierarchical arrangements 
of the field. The rules and standards of the field ultimately benefit those with the most advantages, 
further solidifying their presence within the social order’s hierarchy. 
 
Establishing Incumbents  
 
Inspired by the German universities of the 19th and early 20th centuries, early American re-
search universities increasingly became concerned with graduate education and the advancement of 
knowledge. At the beginning of the 20th century, the presidents of the 14 leading research institu-
tions convened the Association of American Universities (AAU), an organization dedicated to the 
standardization of Ph.D. requirements in an effort to gain recognition of American doctoral pro-
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grams. These AAU institutions can be viewed as the incumbent members of the newly formed field 
of American research universities.  
Reliance on external sources of funding was a common theme amongst early research uni-
versities. As the procurement of the social resources needed for academic research became an in-
creasing concern, revenue from undergraduate tuition continued as a primary source of funding. 
Prior to World War I, the 14 member institutions of the AAU enrolled 10 percent of American col-
lege students, an enrollment needed to supplement the cost of recruiting faculty, educating graduate 
students, and building physical space for experiments to take place. These federal initiatives contin-
ued on a massive scale through World War II and during the Cold War grants from the Department 
of Defense, Department of Energy, and, eventually, the National Science Foundation and National 
Institute of Health served as major sources of research funding (Geiger, 1989). As the federal gov-
ernment established policy regarding federal research and development, incumbent institutions with-
in the field were involved in shaping the shared understandings that define the field rules.  
 
Neoliberal Policy Environment of Texas  
 
Neoliberalism’s influence on the political culture of Texas over the past two decades has 
shifted popular opinion regarding the purpose of higher education from being a public to a private 
good (Harvey, 2007). Through an agenda centered on less government and stricter adherence to 
free-market principles of privatization, deregulation, and competition, it is believed that policy that 
reflects the neoliberal ethic will result in improved efficiency, quality, and affordability within the 
public sector (Harvey, 2007). Privatization of public higher education occurs through shifting the 
responsibility of obtaining a college degree to the individual. One of the primary purposes of higher 
education is to promote social mobility among members of society, as it provides individual students 
with the skills and knowledge necessary to compete for employment in the marketplace (Labaree, 
2005). It is believed that because the individual is benefiting from obtaining a college degree, higher 
education is a private good, thus the responsibility rests upon the student.     
This ideological shift has also had financial repercussions for public institutions through the 
reduction of state appropriations and the deregulation of tuition setting authority, shifting a larger 
share of the financial burden to students. Since 2003, tuition setting authority in Texas has been 
vested with public higher education systems or institutions, allowing universities the ability to raise 
their price without any oversight by the state.   
Unlike many public services, higher education is capable of generating a large portion of its 
operating budget through tuition and fees. Because of this feature, public higher education is often 
targeted for larger budget cuts during troubled economic times. Being disproportionately affected by 
economic cycles, public universities are becoming more reliant on sources other of revenue to main-
tain operating budgets and provide stability (Doyle & Delaney, 2009). Unfortunately in Texas, as in 
the nation, these shortfalls in public support are supplemented by increases in tuition and fees. 
 
Isomorphism and Academic Drift 
 
Within an established field, institutional efforts employed to deal with uncertainty often lead 
to decisions and policies that make organizations more similar in structure. Facing similar environ-
ments, organizational tendencies to resemble one another is understood as isomorphism (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983). This process can result from pressure being exerted by formal and informal stake-
holders or through institutional responses to uncertainty, which leads to imitation. Universities, in an 
effort to seem more legitimate, often mimic other organizations that are perceived to be successful. 
This competition for status encourages homogenization within a field, as prestige and resources are 
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rewarded for efforts to appear more legitimate to peers and innovative to stakeholders (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983).  
Faced with an environment in which external funding became synonymous with increasing 
prestige and legitimacy, a growing administrative bureaucracy shifted resources in directions believed 
to ensure a stable flow of research revenue (Morphew, & Baker, 2001). The generation of revenue 
through faculty practices has always been a fundamental component of American higher education, 
as the teaching and academic research that make up the bulk of their time can contribute large sums 
to university operating budgets. The difference between the universities of today and those of the 
later 20th century, lie in the “breadth and depth” of such market-based behaviors (Slaughter & 
Rhoades, 2004).  
 
NRUF Benchmarks and “Competitive” Markets 
 
Public policies that create competitive funding for resources reward institutions not for effi-
ciency and innovation but for meeting policy objectives that have little to do with free-market prin-
ciples or the benefit of public higher education. The belief that competition will make universities 
more efficient with public money, while also making them more accountable to so-called consumers, 
ignores the difficulty of productivity growth within complex personal services, such as higher educa-
tion (Giroux, 2010). Redirecting resources towards research requires efforts to control costs, possi-
bly leading to diminished quality, such as increasing class sizes or raising the number of courses a 
faculty member teaches each year. These efforts would generate more semester credit hours per year 
for the faculty members and departments, but bigger classes and more students will most likely not 
lead to better education (Archibald & Feldman, 2010). 
The quasi-markets in which ERUs compete lack components essential to free economic 
markets, such as the free flow of producers, open competition for resources, regulation determined 
by price-based exchange between buyer and seller, and the production of goods which are rivalrous 
and/or excludable. Institutions are rewarded not for economic efficiency but for meeting policy ob-
jectives that have little to do with the principles of laissez-faire exchange, allowing particular institu-
tions, which are well situated within the field, disproportional access to these awards (Taylor, Cant-
well, & Slaughter, 2013). Competitive funding policies do not address the issues of public policy en-
vironments, as free-market solutions misunderstand the unique nature of public goods.  
 
Carnegie Classifications as a Symbolic System 
 
Financial resources are not the only capital being coveted by universities looking to expand 
their research abilities within the field of ERUs. Status and prestige provide these institutions with 
perceived legitimacy, and the importance of enrollment growth leads university administrators to 
pursue various rankings or statuses in order to attract students. Research has become emphasized by 
state policy makers as an opportunity to raise revenue and prestige for universities becoming less 
reliant on state appropriations. As institutions dealt with financial uncertainty, decision making tend-
ed to take the form of mimicking the characteristics and attributes of organizations that are under-
stood to be successful. This organizational behavior was fueled by a rankings regime (Gonzales & 
Nunez, 2014) that promoted increased institutionalization by formalizing standard perceptions of 
excellence within the field, leading institutions to drift from their historic missions and purpose as 
regional public universities (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This academic drift has drastic implications 
on the institutional diversity of Texas public higher education, as many regional universities began 
pursuing research status (THECB, 2000).  
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In search of legitimacy, ERUs continue to become more institutionalized through the vari-
ous ranking systems and the influence these organizations have on external resources. This influence 
is more likely to impact decision making at institutions that are vulnerable to status hierarchy created 
by the ranking regime (Bastedo & Bowman, 2009). Increasing revenue through faculty activities such 
as research, promotes external revenues while also increasing the prestige of the institution. Faculty 
work is turned into a commodity with exchange value, continuing neoliberalism’s privatization of 
public higher education (Gonzales & Nunez, 2014, p. 13). 
Attempts to increase a university’s reputation, as a research intensive institution, requires in-
creasing the amount of federal funding the institution receives for research, an incredibly expensive 
and challenging undertaking. In order to be competitive for federal research funds, universities must 
invest in infrastructure and specialized faculty who will conduct such investigations. As the role of 
faculty is shifted towards specialized areas of research, the administrative bureaucracy continues to 
grow as a result of movement away from teaching and shared governance (Morphew & Baker, 2004, 
p. 369).  
More than anything, competition for stagnant resources has led to an increasing proportion 
of the cost of research activities to be picked up by the institution itself. The outdated funding sys-
tem for research funding does not work well for a community that has grown by a factor of 12 over 
the past 50 years. Institutional expectations for research generation have expanded, while funds for 
research have remained flat. Even in the present reality in which universities face increased competi-
tion for external resources, while funding an increasing share of research operating costs, institutions 
continue to stay the course out of fear of being left behind (Stephan, 2012, p. 149).  
 
Implications for State Higher Education 
 
The search of prestige is believed to underserve the demands of students while bringing 
about higher education systems that are less affordable (Morphew, 2009). The tendency for institu-
tions to become more similar is problematic for American higher education systems. Additionally, as 
universities that historically served as access points for public education begin taking on the charac-
teristics and attributes of more costly institutional types, those most in need of the social mobility 
that higher education can provide are the most likely to be priced out of the market (Archibald & 
Feldman, 2009). Many different types of colleges and universities allows for greater learning options 
for students while also providing systems that can adapt and change to specific public needs. Institu-
tions have grown less diverse in past years, even when there has been vast change in almost every 
other facet of higher education (Morphew, 2009). California understood this in 1960, and though it 
seemed as if Clark Kerr and other Master Plan designers were playing favorites when they denied 
California state colleges from establishing research university status, they knew the field conditions 
only benefited incumbent members. To be fair, Texas only had three research universities in 2000, 
while California had eight in 1960. Additional R1 universities were needed in Texas, but competitive 
and market-based policies created priority contradictions for institutions asked to chase prestige 
while also being fiscally accountable to the public. When it was realized additional research universi-
ties were needed in California, new UC campuses were built rather than allow state colleges to 
emerge. The mission of the polytechnic campuses was too important to the social mobility and effi-
ciency of state educational efforts. It was also a way of discouraging any additional colleges that 
wished to emerge within the sub-field of R1.  
Reflecting back on the Master Plan more than 40 years later, Kerr summarized the coordi-
nated efforts of California as simply a “triumph of collective good judgment” (Kerr, 2001). As state 
legislatures determine how to accomplish specific goals related to the development of human capital 
and the financing of public higher education, it is important to understand that organizations re-
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spond to incentives and pressures from a range of stakeholders that exist within multiple fields. Un-
coordinated competitive policies aimed at increasing the number of R1 universities rewards prestige 
and status, which undermine access to educational opportunities, particularly for those most at risk 
of being excluded. 
 
__________ 
 
Sean Ryan, M.Ed., is a doctoral candidate at the University of North Texas studying higher educa-
tion. His research emphasizes the historical legacy of status and inequality as it pertains to organiza-
tional decision-making and higher education policy. 
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